In Defense of Academic Free dom and Faculty Governance: John Dewey, the 100th Anniversary of the AAU P, and the Threat of Corporatization by Eastman, Nicholas J. & Boyles, Deron
Education and culturE 31 (1) (2015): 17-43    17
articlE
in dEfEnsE of acadEmic frEEdom and 
faculty GovErnancE: John dEwEy, thE 100th 
annivErsary of thE aauP, and thE thrEat 
of corPoratization
Nicholas J. Eastman and Deron Boyles
abstract
This essay situates John Dewey in the context of the founding of the Ameri-
can Association of University Professors (AAUP) in 1915. We argue that 
the 1915 Declaration of Principles, together with World War I, provides 
contemporary academics important historical justification for rethinking 
academic freedom and faculty governance in light of neoliberalism and 
what we argue is an increased corporatization of higher education in the 
United States. By revisiting the founding of the AAUP and John Dewey’s 
role in the various debates surrounding the establishment of the organi-
zation—including his broader role as a public intellectual confronted by 
war, questions of duty and freedom, and the shifting boundaries of the 
professoriate—we argue that professors today should demonstrate aca-
demic freedom and reclaim faculty governance for the public good over 
private interests.
introduction
On the verge of the one hundredth anniversary of the founding of the American As-
sociation of University Professors (AAUP), we examine the organization’s focus on 
academic freedom, shared governance, and the challenges the AAUP faced during 
its early years. The history is a fairly uncontested one: higher education in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the United States was the context for 
the struggle over academic freedom and shared governance. Dismissed professors, 
resignations by colleagues, and the struggle of professionalization characterize the 
period.1 A century later, we wonder about the state of academic freedom and shared 
governance. We argue that higher education is currently so influenced by corpora-
tization and neoliberal entrepreneurialism that it is limiting the rights of professors, 
often with colleagues looking the other way or, worse, enacting administrative fiat 
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under the pretense of faculty governance. We focus on the beginning of the AAUP 
and contemporary issues, not at the exclusion of the 1940 AAUP statement, the 
McCarthy era threats, the so-called “disruptions” of the 1960s and 1970s, and so 
on, but as a means of recapturing the significance of the origination of the AAUP 
and to challenge readers not to retreat from the intellectual courage that was so 
eloquently, though not unproblematically, articulated a hundred years ago. 
historical considErations
The creation of the AAUP is a seminal event in the history of academic freedom 
because it marked the first time professors from across the United States came to-
gether to create a lasting interdisciplinary body dedicated to preserving the integ-
rity of scholarship, teaching, and learning in higher education against intramural 
and extramural pressures, and sought to define for themselves what was accept-
able academic speech. Leading up to the founding of the AAUP in 1915, as Robert 
Ludlum details, university professors—and university presidents—faced firings 
for a variety of reasons. Professors and administrators were dismissed for making 
claims that were incompatible with the religious institutions in which they were 
typically employed. In some instances, they stated controversial positions regard-
ing social, political, and scientific issues (e.g., slavery, evolution); in other instances, 
they offended wealthy college benefactors with statements made in public speeches 
about graft and corruption. In still other instances, personality clashes within and 
among departments led to being fired.2
Prior to the AAUP, professors had little power over their own and their col-
leagues’ tenure. Alexander Winchell was fired from Vanderbilt University in 1878 
because of his scientific views on evolution. The University of Chicago dismissed 
Edward Bemis in 1895 because of his participation in events linked to the Pull-
man strike. Edward A. Ross was fired in 1900 from Stanford University for making 
claims against railroad companies, Chinese immigrants, and the gold standard.3 
J. McKeen Cattell, a figure we will return to, was fired from Columbia in 1917 be-
cause of his opposition to World War I—after twenty-six years as a professor at 
Columbia.4 In each of these cases, colleagues protested, and some of them went 
so far as to resign. They did so in the face of a power structure that reinforced the 
centrality of boards of trustees and university presidents. According to Thorstein 
Veblen, university presidents, while not immune themselves from the pressures of 
boards of trustees, nonetheless exercised a virtual
plenary power of appointment, preferment, and removal, backed as this 
power is by a nearly indefeasible blacklist. So well is the academic blacklist 
understood, indeed, and so sensitive and trustworthy is the fearsome loyalty 
of the common run among academic men [sic], that very few among them 
will venture openly to say a good word for any one of their colleagues who 
may have fallen under the displeasure of some incumbent of executive office.5
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When, as Daniel Pollitt and Jordan Kurland note, the first five cases were formally 
heard by the AAUP in 1915, they were only the latest in a long line brought by ag-
grieved faculty members and administrators.6 
The first of the five cases was at the University of Utah, where seventeen 
faculty members, including the deans of the Law School and College of Arts and 
Sciences, resigned in protest over the firing of two faculty colleagues.7 Three other 
cases included Wesleyan University, University of Colorado, and University of Mon-
tana. Perhaps the most recognized of the first five cases, however, was the case of 
Scott Nearing at the University of Pennsylvania. Nearing was a popular econom-
ics professor who nonetheless irritated alumni and trustees with statements made 
off-campus. Upon his firing, 1,500 students and 60 faculty members signed a state-
ment of protest but to no avail.8
Higher education around the turn of the twentieth century saw a significant 
transformation in academics in addition to new sources of funds and structures 
of governance. As new universities were built across the country, new intellectual 
ground was broken with the creation of new departments in the natural and so-
cial sciences, and inquiry and scholarship within these new fields, especially the 
social sciences, were not always palatable to those in power within and outside 
the universities. As Walter Metzger points out, “changes in the academic setting 
set off changes in the academic calling,” and a far greater degree of intellectual 
diversity than had existed in the nineteenth-century’s pious institutions of higher 
education accompanied the new diversity of academic disciplines.9 The AAUP’s 
founding members understood that, in order to advance these disciplines for 
the good of the academic institution and the broader public, scholars needed the 
freedom to pursue the unconventional. Such pursuits, they realized, opened them 
up to attack from the very groups they saw as the beneficiaries of their inquiry: 
their institutions (specifically administrators) and the public. For this reason, the 
founders of the AAUP believed it necessary to outline the professor’s function as a 
public intellectual. As the AAUP’s founding president, John Dewey was in charge 
of appointing Committee A to investigate matters of academic freedom, and one 
of the AAUP’s founder members and secretary, Arthur Lovejoy, played a lead-
ing role in investigating many of the cases brought in front of the organization 
during its first year. One result of Lovejoy’s work was the creation of a document 
that would provide “a clear understanding of the principles which bear upon the 
matter,” and which would lead to “the adoption by the universities of such ar-
rangements and regulations as may effectually prevent any infringement of that 
freedom and deprive of plausibility all charges of such infringement.”10 The 1915 
Declaration of Principles (hereafter, 1915 Declaration) attempted to provide clari-
fication for three facets of the job of the university professor: “freedom of inquiry 
and research; freedom of teaching within the university or college; and freedom 
of extra-mural utterance and action.”11 
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Although it sought to clarify the role of professor, the declaration crosses 
back and forth between professors’ rights to express themselves “to students and 
to the general public, without fear or favor”12 and the requirement that the results 
of their inquiries “be set forth with dignity, courtesy, and temperateness of lan-
guage.”13 Students’ confidence in their professors would be shaken if they felt that 
the professors were not expressing themselves “fully and frankly, or that college 
and university teachers in general are a repressed and intimidated class.”14 The 
AAUP argued that if the professors were to fulfill their duties to their students 
and to the public, the university must remain “an intellectual experiment station, 
where new ideas may germinate and where their fruit, though still distasteful to 
the community as a whole, may be allowed to ripen” for the greater good of a free 
and democratic society.15 
The AAUP argued that the responsibility of deciding which utterances 
achieved the proper balance of full and frank expression and temperateness of 
language should not be up to individual administrators or governing boards com-
prised of laypeople. Rather, as the AAUP laid out in its first practical proposal, the 
decision should be in the hands of “suitable judicial bodies, composed of members 
of the academic profession.”16 The United States’ entrance into World War I just a 
little over fifteen months after the AAUP formally adopted the 1915 Declaration 
would present a number of significant challenges to its ideal of self-governance and 
exert remarkable pressure on the matter of what counted as appropriate speech for 
university professors. 
The war unfolded at a time in U.S. history when the influx of immigrants in 
the 1890s was joined by the expansion of the industrial revolution and social ini-
tiatives steeped in the rhetoric of democracy and progressivism.17 While the Civil 
War was fought without foreign intervention, the Spanish-American War of 1898 
and the ensuing decision to annex the Philippines indicated to the world that the 
United States had the potential to expand beyond isolationist politics and become 
a player on the global stage.18 Above all, as Robert Wiebe points out, “the most 
powerful influence was a generalized sense of national crisis, one which millions 
predicated but could not define.”19 
Crisis brought about an intense form of jingoism. Citizens eagerly, if hege-
monically, followed the dictates of an increasingly bureaucratized and specialized 
national government. Beyond volunteering for enlistment, parading in support of 
troops, buying bonds, and contributing to the Red Cross, there was a marked in-
crease in the vilification of all things German and of anyone whose name appeared 
“foreign.” Indeed, as Wiebe notes, Americans 
answered the imperative yet misty questions about America’s danger, they 
pointed to visible, available enemies, they played upon a host of incipient 
anxieties, and they satisfied the urge to violence. Only this exceptional 
appeal can account for the eagerness with which people made the most 
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preposterous connections between foreign and domestic dangers; between 
the German menace and the Non-Partisan League, for example, or Bol-
shevism and the American Federation of Labor.20
Verging on paranoia, antiradicalism spread in such a way that unions, peace or-
ganizations, and antiwar magazines increasingly became targets for marginaliza-
tion, if not extermination. 
At the same time, the initial causes for which the AAUP was developed also 
altered because of the war. In advocating academic freedom, the AAUP had early 
committed itself to a position defending the rights of faculty members but found 
itself facing the wave of superpatriotism that attacked any organization that ap-
peared to undermine a singular, nationalist identity. Questioning during war be-
came unpatriotic or, worse, treasonous. 
Initially, Dewey showed reluctant support for U.S. intervention in World 
War I, which he saw as having the potential to spread liberal democracy to the op-
pressed European masses. The modern world was too industrial, too mobile, and 
too interdependent to cling to the idea that isolation was a realistic possibility or 
that democracy was limited to national concerns. Issues of economic fairness and 
ethnic, racial, and cultural diversity were global in nature, and Woodrow Wilson’s 
decision to go to war was not, according to Dewey’s initial judgment, limited to 
protecting the economic interests of the American ruling class. The war was, ac-
cording to Wilson’s rhetoric, a war of democracy against autocracy and a war of 
freedom against oppression. As Robert Westbrook argues, “Dewey’s support for 
American intervention in World War I was rooted less in pragmatic reason than 
in blind hope. . . . In so doing, he fell victim to fuzziness of purpose, ideological 
idealization of an American mission, and uncritical adoption of inefficient, coun-
terproductive technique.”21 Dewey had, in 1915, considered Germany’s ability to 
mobilize an entire country toward achieving its autocratic aims and worried that 
the dualistic tendencies Germany inherited from Immanuel Kant “bifurcated the 
German mind.”22 He initially thought the United States was justified in entering 
the war in order to overcome such dualistic thinking. 
While a number of Dewey’s fellow progressives shared in his optimism about 
the purpose and potential of the war, Randolph Bourne did not. Bourne’s “A War 
Diary” and “Twilight of Idols,” both published in the fall of 1917, let loose his con-
tempt for Dewey and other pragmatists he saw “clinging wistfully to the belief 
that our war could get itself justified for an idealistic flavor, or at least for a world-
renovating social purpose,” arguing that if Dewey and other pro-war progressives 
had not been swept up in the fervor of patriotism and had instead “turn[ed] their 
philosophy on themselves, they might have seen how thinly disguised a rationaliza-
tion this was of their emotional undertow.”23 Caught up in the idea that the Great 
War could spread democracy throughout Europe and be a war to end all wars, 
Dewey, according to Bourne, found himself in the unfamiliar territory of “values 
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. . . subordinated to technique.”24 Having been both Dewey’s student and a strong 
admirer of his philosophy, Bourne felt abandoned by the pragmatists, whose phi-
losophy, he believed, had its rightful place in transforming society through educa-
tion rather than violence:
[A] rational nation would have chosen education as its national enter-
prise. . . . But the nation did not use its isolation from the conflict to 
educate itself. It fretted for three years and then let war, not education, 
be chosen, at the almost unanimous behest of our intellectual class, 
from motives alien to our cultural needs, and for political ends alien to 
the happiness of the individual. . . . What concerns us here is the rela-
tive ease with which the pragmatist intellectuals, with Professor Dewey 
at the head, have moved out their philosophy, bag and baggage, from 
education to war.25
Bourne argued that Dewey and other pragmatists who supported U.S. intervention 
were disastrously naïve about the possibility of directing the country’s patriotism 
and educational and civic institutions toward peace and pluralistic democracy 
instead of victory and rabid nationalism. Whether Bourne’s own pacifist commit-
ments prevented him from taking full account of the political realities of the conflict 
or the consequences of American neutrality, and a potential German victory, is up 
for debate. Nonetheless, Bourne’s critique of Dewey’s optimism regarding the war 
remains relevant. As Alan Cywar argues, “the vital question respecting Dewey’s 
philosophy becomes not how it failed to keep American progressives out of the war, 
but how it did not succeed in bringing the conflict to a better conclusion.”26 In this 
respect, Dewey’s assessment of the necessity of military force might well have been 
accurate, but this does not change the fact that he had underappreciated the power 
of nationalistic and capitalistic interests to direct American intervention toward 
different purposes through propaganda. Indeed, Dewey ultimately abandoned the 
idea that military force could serve as an instrument for democracy. Writing in 
1923, Dewey admitted that “the war created an illusion of real unity to which many 
fell victims, myself among the number.”27
The educational fallout of what Bourne had called the “war-technique” 
came quite close to home for Dewey when Nicholas Murray Butler, the president 
of Columbia University, designated himself the judge, jury, and executioner of 
the career of any professor testing the boundaries of academic freedom regard-
ing the war. Whereas the 1915 Declaration had called for faculty associations to 
be in charge of self-governance and self-discipline in matters of academic free-
dom, Butler contended, “What had been tolerated before becomes intolerable now. 
What had been wrongheadedness was now sedition. What had been folly was now 
treason,” and for any person who “acts, speaks, or writes treason,” according to 
Butler’s definition thereof, “the separation of such a person from Columbia will 
be as speedy as the discovery of his offense.”28 Butler dismissed two Columbia 
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professors, James McKeen Cattell and Henry Wadsworth Longfellow Dana, for 
what he considered treasonous acts. In Cattell’s case, treason amounted to writ-
ing a letter to Congress in support of a bill that would send only voluntary forces 
to fight in Europe. For Dana, participating in the radical-pacifist People’s Council 
and advocating that students protest the proposed Conscription Act qualified as 
sedition and grounds for termination. Butler bypassed the faculty committee, on 
which Dewey sat, that had been formed to investigate matters of academic free-
dom. Dewey resigned from the committee in protest but remained at Columbia. 
The pendulum of academic freedom had swung decidedly away from the rights of 
professors expressing themselves fully and frankly toward their duties to exercise 
caution and temperateness of language.
Extreme caution and deference to patriotism is on full display in the AAUP’s 
“Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom in Wartime,” which was produced 
by a special subcommittee of the General Committee on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure. The subcommittee, also led by Lovejoy, found that the 1915 Declaration 
was written and ratified during a time of peace and that it was now necessary to 
reinterpret these principles in a time of war. Lovejoy took great pains to shore up 
the patriotic credibility of American universities, boasting that they had done more 
than any other institution to fill the ranks of the military and that it had been their 
“supreme pride to have trained a body of youth, who in this time of testing of our 
national fibre [sic], have with the rarest exceptions manifested a splendid and self-
devoting loyalty to the cause of their country.”29 Whereas the American university 
in 1915 had been an “inviolable refuge” from the “tyranny of public opinion,”30 it 
now listed its direct and indirect influence on public opinion among its other con-
tributions to the war effort.
Once the professoriate’s patriotic credentials are established, the report moves 
on to the matter of treason, warning that the heightened tension during a time of 
war often leads to the charge of treason being equivalent to its proof.31 The report 
concedes that clear acts of treason should be handled by governmental authorities, 
but it maintains that the public statements and acts of a citizen who is also a univer-
sity professor should remain matters of academic freedom and, as such, should be 
adjudicated by a faculty committee per the 1915 Declaration. The report addresses 
the case of Cattell not to comment on whether his acts as a citizen were treasonous 
but as an example of what occurs when the authority of deciding such a matter was 
inappropriately taken out of the hands of a faculty committee. 
The report makes four detailed recommendations for how the university 
should approach academic freedom during times of war. While the third and fourth 
sections argue that professors cannot be forced into voluntary war efforts or be 
dismissed solely due to German or Austro-Hungarian ancestry, the first two deal 
directly with matters of freedom of speech and obedience to law. The first states 
that those convicted of breaking the law should be immediately dismissed from the 
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university, while those who are under indictment should be temporarily suspended 
from their university duties until a formal verdict is reached. Regarding consci-
entious objectors, the report recommends the matter be left to the courts without 
“supplementary disciplinary actions” from the college or university—as long as it 
is established by a faculty committee that the professor has refrained from distrib-
uting propaganda or proselytizing both within and outside the university walls.32
The report takes up propaganda, specifically as it relates to matters of con-
scription, in its second point of clarification on academic freedom during war. Dis-
seminating propaganda for the purpose of causing others to resist lawful forced 
military service is, the committee argues, grounds for immediate dismissal, as it 
directly promotes disobeying the law. However, since the declaration of war is a 
congressional power, opposition to the war becomes opposition to the law: 
Before war is declared, it is any citizen’s right to oppose such a declara-
tion; while the war is going on, it is his right to express his opinion as to 
the terms upon which peace is to be concluded, and as to the wisdom or 
efficacy of proposed measures and instrumentalities for the proposed con-
duct of war; but it is not his right between the declaration of war and the 
conclusion of peace to obstruct or impede the execution of any measure 
lawfully determined upon as requisite for the safety of the country and the 
successful prosecution of the war.33
According to the report’s subsequent examples, statements about the categorical 
immorality of war qualify as openly hostile to the government’s lawful war efforts, 
and while they may be permissible (if also distasteful) during peacetime, they are 
“manifest incitement to disaffection and public disorder” during wartime.34 
Although he never directly addressed Bourne’s criticisms, Dewey came to 
see the power war propaganda had to incite destructive nationalism and smother 
possibilities for intelligence to guide policies toward a lasting peace. While even 
after the war he maintained that American intervention was necessary in order to 
prevent a German victory that would have proved disastrous for Europe and the 
United States, he was humbled by the degree to which his own dispassionate clar-
ity of thought had been vulnerable to the strong current of nationalist sentiment:
The ideals of the United States have been defeated in the settlement be-
cause we took into the war our sentimentalism, our attachment to moral 
sentiments as efficacious powers, our pious optimism as to the inevitable 
victory of the ‘right,’ our childish belief that physical energy can do the 
work that only intelligence can do, our evangelical hypocrisy that morals 
and ‘ideals’ have a self-propelling and self-executing capacity.35 
After the war, Dewey had little hope that the Treaty of Versailles or the League of 
Nations could lead to a lasting peace, and to that end, he joined his friend Salmon 
Levinson in his “Outlawry” effort to start a movement to make war illegal.36 Both 
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Levinson and Dewey came to see the League of Nations as an instrument of future 
wars rather than an impediment to them. Early in 1917, Dewey had hoped that the 
war would unite people across the world through democratic partnerships. The 
League, however, was a partnership of aristocratic governments, the very same 
governments whose national interests had fueled the war. In other words, demo-
cratic ideology had indeed spread, but it was of the top-down, managerial variety 
concerned more with securing markets for industry and circulating capital than 
sustaining a bottom-up movement for international human rights. The result of the 
war, according to Dewey, was the consolidation of power instead of its diffusion. 
While these consolidated powers might pay lip service to war as a last resort or a 
defensive measure, these were the same hollow justifications those in power had 
always used in the prosecution of unjust wars. Dewey’s new hope was that outlaw-
ing war would force other, more democratic methods of diplomacy.37 
Lovejoy criticized Dewey’s opposition to the League as well as his desire to 
outlaw war, seeing Dewey’s stance as one that was too uncompromising and im-
practical to address the political realities of the modern world. Considering that 
Lovejoy’s report on academic freedom during wartime equated vocal and public 
opposition to the government’s legal declaration of war with stirring up public un-
rest and inappropriate agitation, Dewey’s contention that war should be outlawed 
was, in fact, a practical perspective that sought to preserve democratic diversity of 
opinion against oppressive political orthodoxy.
Dewey’s disagreement with Lovejoy continued into the mid-1920s when the 
AAUP, the American Association of Colleges (AAC), the American Association of 
Universities (AAU), and a number of other organizations of higher education met 
to revisit and amend the 1915 Declaration. Only the AAUP and the AAC, which 
was more conservative and represented the interests of college presidents, adopted 
the proposed changes to the 1915 Declaration. The result of this partnership was 
the 1925 Statement of Principles, which borrows heavily from the 1915 document 
regarding what constitutes academic freedom and the rules of tenure. The most 
noticeable difference between the two documents is that the latter jettisons the 
lengthy philosophical justifications of its tenets in favor of a concise series of para-
graphs—four regarding academic freedom and four addressing tenure—that fit 
on less than three pages. 
What was added is, perhaps, more important than what was cut.38 The writers 
of the 1915 Declaration did not wish to enumerate grounds for dismissal, preferring 
instead to leave those decisions to each institution’s faculty committees; however, 
they did list “grave moral delinquency” as an exception to the recommended three-
month notice of dismissal prior to the end of the academic year. The 1925 document 
calls for similar oversight of dismissals by faculty committees working in tandem 
with the governing board of the university. “Exceptions to this rule,” the document 
notes, “may be necessary in cases of gross immorality or treason when the facts are 
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admitted. In such cases summary dismissal would naturally ensue.”39 Upon reading 
that charges of treason had been added as grounds for immediate dismissal, Dewey 
wrote to Lovejoy and H. W. Tyler, who had chaired the conference, expressing his 
concern that the wording placed charges of treason in the court of public opinion 
instead of law, since, if a member of a university faculty was convicted of treason 
in a court of law, there need be no further investigation or measures taken by the 
university. Further, relying on a popular interpretation of the views of individual 
administrators or governing boards to define treason allowed for abuse of power. 
Charges of treason, Dewey argued, “might be employed in cases similar to those 
arising during the late war to justify the dismissal of teachers whose views on na-
tional policy were contrary to the patriotic sentiments of the time.”40 Cattell’s and 
Dana’s careers, as well as Dewey’s own frustration at having his committee by-
passed by Butler, were clearly still fresh in his mind, as was, perhaps, his regret at 
having been among those too easily persuaded by arguments for U.S. involvement 
in the war. Tyler reasoned that leaving the word out risked losing the support of 
the conservative AAC, and his tepid response that the word “would probably do 
no real harm” was anything but convincing.41 While Tyler was motivated by naïve 
appeasement, Metzger argues that Lovejoy “still needed more time to recuperate 
from the illness of superpatriotism.”42 His response to Dewey’s concern that the 
word treason might be used prejudicially was that there had been a gentleman’s 
agreement that it be understood in the legal sense. If it were used to silence dissent, 
Lovejoy argued, the professor would be in a position to sue for damages. It is dif-
ficult to see how the possibility of compensation is the same as adequate defense of 
academic freedom—unless we update the context and reevaluate academic freedom 
in light of the corporatized university. 
bridGinG thE aauP’s idEa of acadEmic frEEdom with  
contEmPorary issuEs in hiGhEr Education
The cry for academic freedom in American universities originated from the early 
European scholars’ cry for the freedom to philosophize, or libertas philosophandi, 
and especially from the German professors’ variation of such freedom, particu-
larly their notion of freedom of inquiry characterized by the term lehrfreiheit.43 
The American version of academic freedom was first explicitly given expression 
in the 1915 Declaration’s treatment of the key facets of academic life: freedom of 
inquiry and research; freedom of teaching; and freedom of extramural utterance 
and action. The authors posited these freedoms as being in the public’s interest, 
since boards of trustees, as the legal authority of their institutions, were actually 
entrusted by the state with providing a crucial service to the public, and trustees 
could not legitimately assume this public trust without granting professors the 
freedoms necessary to accomplish the latter’s own public duty: to serve society with 
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the knowledge they produce. Metzger points out that by framing higher education 
as a public trust and the professors’ freedom of inquiry as a public service, the au-
thors of the 1915 Declaration got around the fact that in the United States, unlike 
in Germany, higher education took place in private as well as public institutions.44
Metzger also argues that the American notions of academic freedom as ex-
pressed in the 1915 Declaration were unlike the German notions granting freedoms 
to the professor, the student, and even the institution itself; in America, academic 
freedom came to stand for the freedom of the academic. It did not stand, Metzger 
argues, for the freedom of the student to learn or for the institution in general, ex-
cept in cases where a threat to the autonomy of the institution bore directly on the 
academic (e.g., when states required loyalty oaths of their employees after World 
War II). Metzger explains that the primary concern of the 1915 Declaration was with 
what happened in a university, not with what happened to a university.45 Metzger’s 
reading appears to be correct, but only in the most superficial sense. Academics 
are institutional beings, and in being granted rights, it is for the institution itself 
that those rights are granted, since academics act on its behalf when they act as 
academics. This is true even when it means that the institution’s own actions will 
be constrained. To authorize the academic to act is to authorize the institution 
to act, since they are in a mutually constitutive relationship with each other. The 
1915 Declaration recognizes this distinction in its call for university professors to 
be understood as appointees of the university instead of its employees: “University 
teachers should be understood to be, with respect to the conclusions reached and 
expressed by them, no more subject to the control of the trustees, than are judges 
subject to the control of the President, with respect to their decisions.”46 The aca-
demic exists because the institution exists, and the institution exists because the 
academic exists, each being the other’s raison d’être. Thus, what happens to the 
university also happens in the university, since neither the university nor its aca-
demic exists without the other.
The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, the de-
finitive understanding of the AAUP’s stance on academic freedom, while impos-
ing some responsibilities on the academic, also accepted the premises of the 1915 
Declaration, namely, that the primary concerns of the academic are inquiry and 
research, teaching, and extramural activities; that the institution assumes a public 
trust; and that academic freedom is exercised in service of the public, stating that the 
“free search for truth and its free exposition” is the basis for “the common good.”47 
To have received the almost universal acceptance that it has, however, meant that 
the 1940 Statement had to be more nuanced in elaborating upon these freedoms 
than was the 1915 Declaration. Thus, while professors should enjoy freedom of in-
quiry, they also should be honest in conducting research; while professors should 
have the freedom to teach their courses, they should stick to matters within their 
expertise; and while professors, also being citizens of the larger public, should be 
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able to express issues important to them, they should be careful to dissociate them-
selves from their institutions when doing so.48
Nevertheless, the core premises of the 1915 Declaration were assumed by 
the latter Statement. The first premise is that academic institutions assume a pub-
lic trust, so that the professors’ activities are public services, that is, they serve the 
common good. Whether this remains a valid premise or not hinges on the exis-
tence of something “public” that is separate, distinct, and perhaps in opposition 
to something “private.” The second premise is that the primary activities of the 
professors (inquiry, teaching, and extramural utterances) require the freedom to 
perform them, since they are public services. 
thE corPoratE univErsity as a Public trust
As we have already stated, the AAUP’s founders had ample reason to be concerned 
about private industry’s ability to influence the primary activities of the academic. 
They sought to shield professors at both private and public universities from ad-
ministrators and boards of trustees acting on behalf of private industry by arguing 
that the trustees of any educational institution that appeals to the public for sup-
port are necessarily trustees for the public rather than their private benefactors. 
The 1915 Declaration posits that “any university which lays restrictions upon the 
intellectual freedom of its professors proclaims itself a proprietary institution, and 
should be so described whenever it makes a general appeal for funds; and the public 
should be advised that the institution has no claim whatever to general support or 
regard.”49 At the core of this statement are the beliefs that education is fundamen-
tally different from job training and that higher learning at the university was, and 
should always remain, indissoluble from freedom of inquiry and teaching for the 
public’s benefit. This is so because any effort to streamline or standardize academic 
practices to conform to the university’s governing economic interests or ideology 
is anathema to how higher learning functions as a public service in a democratic 
society. The founders of the AAUP understood education to be a public service, 
even when that education takes place at a private university. A university, public 
or private, whose primary function was workforce training is not, on their view, 
an educational institution but rather a proprietary one.
What, then, do we make of our current institutions of higher education? De-
spite the prevalence of references to public service in university mission statements, 
we argue that the idea that the university today actually functions as a public trust 
is highly questionable. With the drastic reduction of public funding to colleges and 
universities, corporate-sponsored research and grant activity is increasing mark-
edly. The steady erosion of the public sector and communitarianism, and its re-
placement by neoliberal ideologies favoring privatization and individualism, have 
resulted in a profound transformation of the purpose of the university. Far from 
being exclusively or even primarily a site for free and open inquiry in the pursuit 
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of truth for the public good, the university, especially since the 1970s, functions 
instead as a publicly subsidized servant of transnational corporations that provides 
a skilled workforce and, more importantly, proprietary research and development, 
with emphasis most recently in the areas of science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (STEM). We wonder if it would not be better to have the platitudes of 
public service taken from university mission statements and replaced with a list of 
corporate sponsors. Better yet, the corporations could display their brands along-
side school insignia in keeping with the 1915 Declaration’s stance that proprietary 
institutions “should not be permitted to sail under false colors.”50 
In what ways, then, do universities differ from private corporations? Slaughter 
and Rhoades argue that, while the goal of academic capitalism may be to generate 
greater amounts of private wealth for corporations, privatization is not the aim of 
the corporate university itself, since it would then lose its privileges as a nonprofit 
institution. Instead, the corporate university is able to receive continued public-
sector support while preserving its access to private markets. As neoliberal poli-
cies place greater restrictions on public funds, however, universities have more of 
an incentive to raise tuition and seek corporate partnerships.51 By dissolving the 
boundary between public concerns and private gains, academic capitalism “entails 
a redefinition of public space and of appropriate activity in that space,”52 where 
appropriate activity is defined as that which aligns with and promotes capitalist 
models of growth, both for the university (in enrollment, endowment, and contin-
ued grant funding) and its corporate sponsors (as return on investment in terms 
of financial and human resources). 
This redefinition is most apparent in the extent to which higher education 
(like K–12 education) has adopted the language and logic of the marketplace. 
Students and the public more generally are now understood to be “clients,” “con-
stituents,” and “customers,” and maximizing return on investment dictates that edu-
cational outcomes be quantifiable rather than qualitative. Colleges and universities 
are now being asked to document not only graduation rates and time-to-completion 
data, but the rate of employment of graduates and their corresponding salaries.53 
Such accounting discourse inevitably favors profitability and employability over 
other concerns such as criticality, social justice, or deliberative democracy—since 
the former produce more reliable sources of data while reinforcing rather than 
challenging commercial interests. The requirement that educational success and 
excellence be measured in order to be understood has led to an explosion in ad-
ministrative hiring that seeks to execute the closely related corporate functions of 
brand management and quality control that, at best, have little to do with free in-
quiry and the quality of teaching and learning and, at worst, are counterproductive 
to these aims as public services. 
On the brand management or marketing side, resources that might otherwise 
be utilized for academic purposes such as library acquisitions, funding scholarship 
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unlikely to receive grant subsidies, supporting graduate students, and hiring new 
full-time, tenure-track faculty are diverted to services and facilities that appeal 
to students as consumers. Online courses proliferate on the logic of convenience. 
Multimillion-dollar recreational and athletic facilities become integral in recruiting 
undergraduate students, and nonacademic buildings such as student centers (some-
times paradoxically called student unions) are mini-malls in which transnational 
corporations such as fast food and beverage chains and booksellers gain access to 
their target market without the students needing to leave campus. 
It is no surprise that the dramatic rise in full-time university administrative 
and management positions that handle the corporate consultants, expenditures, 
licensing, and revenue streams associated with student living (as opposed to student 
learning) has been accompanied by an overreliance on non-tenure-track instruc-
tors, who now shoulder the responsibility of most college instruction. The AAUP 
argues that “[n]on-tenure-track positions of all types now account for 76 percent 
of all instructional staff appointments in American higher education” and that 
this trend reflects a shift in priorities rather than an economic necessity since “the 
greatest growth in contingent appointments [has] occurred during times of eco-
nomic prosperity.”54 It is certainly the case that universities today are altogether 
more inclusive demographically than they were even a few decades ago and that this 
has made some of the new administrative and student support positions justified. 
Adding administrative positions in student services, however, does not validate 
the loss of academic support and mentoring that students experience when many 
of their undergraduate courses are vulnerable to the high turnover rate that comes 
with employing contingent faculty. The chilling effect that this corporate restruc-
turing has on the primary domains of academic freedom as addressed in the 1915 
Declaration (inquiry, teaching, and extramural speech) is a topic we will return 
to, but, for now, it provides sufficient evidence that, while the corporate university 
may well serve multiple interests, it does not serve them equally.
When profitability and competitive rankings are the administration’s top 
priorities, “quality control” becomes a matter of streamlining and standardizing 
services according to a factory model that minimizes costs and maximizes output. 
Online course offerings increase and departments that fail to meet their numbers are 
either shuttered or repurposed to support those that do (e.g., foreign language de-
partments offering more courses in international business). Students, who through 
escalating tuition and fees have come to bear much of the burden of the state’s de-
clining support of higher education, are under tremendous economic pressure to 
leave college, credentials in hand, as quickly as possible in order to avoid crippling 
debt. Time to degree and job placement statistics have become the primary means 
by which university administrators market the quality of their institutions to pro-
spective students (and their families) looking to secure a place for themselves in 
an increasingly precarious job market. Equating quality and efficiency, however, 
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points to a fundamental misunderstanding of the very commodity the university 
is in a unique position to offer: an intellectual experience. We agree with Raphael 
Sassower that the increasing failure of corporate university administrators to fully 
invest in and support their faculty and libraries and prioritize pedagogy over the 
university’s countless other services amounts to a significant lapse in quality con-
trol and, as such, is a failure of the very logic that governs academic capitalism. As 
Sassower contends,
But even if university administrators were better corporate managers or 
leaders, they would still fail to admit the most important distinguishing 
factors that set the academy apart from other institutions of contemporary 
culture. Academic institutions should be devoted to harboring intellectual 
rebels and fermenting dissent from the debilitating effects of power and 
authority, may it be church, state, or industry. As such, they should be of-
fering a sanctuary of sorts.55
Of course, such a sanctuary is open to fewer and fewer professors (and by exten-
sion, their students) with each new concession to the demands of profitability and 
efficiency. Adjuncts and other part-time instructors who lack tenure invariably 
experience the pressure to self-censor in light of their expendability. Even the ten-
ured and long-term non-tenure-track professors are increasingly vulnerable to the 
demands that academic capitalism and the consumer culture of higher education 
place on free inquiry, teaching, and extramural speech. 
thE Primary activitiEs of thE acadEmic
Freedom of Inquiry 
Despite (or perhaps because of) the tremendous growth the university has experi-
enced over the last century, the fundamental concerns of Dewey and the AAUP’s 
founders are as critical today as they were during the early decades of the twenti-
eth century. Dewey’s 1902 essay “Academic Freedom” shows his great concern that 
money, “indispensable as a means,” holds the power to override the educational 
purposes of the university. “If the university is to be a true university,” he warns, 
“money and all things connected therewith must be subordinate. But the pressure 
to get the means is tending to make it an end; and this is academic materialism—
the worst foe of freedom of work in its widest sense.”56 Although the founders of 
the AAUP recognized and addressed the threats material interests posed to the free 
pursuit of knowledge for the public good in the 1915 Declaration, an undercurrent 
of optimism that such threats were in decline tempers their sense of caution. Indeed, 
the AAUP’s 1940 Statement acknowledges that pecuniary gain could be detrimen-
tal to academic freedom, but so entrenched was the idea that disinterested (as op-
posed to proprietary) research was the primary function of academic inquiry that 
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the authors of the Statement assumed that pecuniary motivation was an anomaly 
that could be kept in check by the requirement that the researcher(s) disclose such 
motivations. This stands in stark contrast to the prevailing attitude of those who 
wield the greatest power in shaping academic inquiry today: university administra-
tors, policy makers, and corporate officials. Unwilling to continue with traditional 
models of academic funding that support disinterested research, universities, in 
concert with state and federal entities, have turned to promoting the interests of 
global capital over the public good, making academics into entrepreneurs whose 
careers depend on their ability to secure funding from sources outside of the uni-
versity. As competition for state and federal grants intensifies due to their increas-
ing scarcity, academics turn to corporate sponsors to underwrite their careers.
In March 2014, Carole Vance and Kim Hopper, two longtime scholars in 
Columbia University’s Mailman School of Public Health, were fired for failing to 
secure the required 80 percent of their salaries through grant funding.57 Vance 
and Hopper, who both held non-tenure-track appointments but had been at Co-
lumbia for 27 and 26 years respectively, are leaders in their fields. Vance’s work 
explores the various and often contentious ways that human sexuality intersects 
with human rights and matters of public policy and health. Recently, she has fo-
cused her scholarship on sex trafficking and the potential ethnographic research 
holds for informing public policy. Hopper’s research examines historical and 
current practices of psychiatric care and issues pertaining to homelessness. He is 
the past president of the National Coalition for the Homeless and has spent three 
decades as an advocate for the rights of the homeless. Both scholars are politically 
engaged public intellectuals whose work within and outside of the academy has 
been in service to society’s most vulnerable populations and who have provided 
important critiques of domestic as well as international policies affecting those 
populations. Mailman’s policy that professors become entrepreneurs who fund 
80 percent of their own salaries, a policy that pertains to both tenure and non- 
tenure-track appointments, functions as a de facto and detached form of censorship 
that channels inquiry toward whatever holds the greatest grant-getting potential. 
Under such a regime, academic prospecting consumes a considerable portion of 
the scholar’s time, especially for non-tenure-track researchers who can no longer 
rely on their public service or even reputable academic publications to guarantee 
employment. Having secured much of their own funding, scholars must devote 
a large percentage of their working hours meeting the conditions of their grants 
(80 percent for National Institutes of Health grants).58 This leaves academics with 
little remaining time to pursue other lines of inquiry or forms of public service, 
such as teaching or mentoring, both of which were widely recognized points of 
excellence for Hopper and Vance. Prioritizing grants above all other academic en-
deavors confirms Dewey’s fears that funding would become the end rather than 
the means of academic life.
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Of course, not all departments are equally subjected to the grants culture. That 
professors in the humanities are not usually required to secure their own sources 
of funding, however, has less to do with the fact that inquiry in these fields enjoys 
greater protection than the social, natural, or computer sciences and more to do with 
the fact that it is simply less valuable to corporate interests. Although this may seem 
like a blessing, it comes at the price of being viewed as a set of disciplines for which 
the doors are kept open and the lights kept on through the beneficent subsidies of 
the money-making disciplines. These subsidies come with pressure to limit costs 
by reducing the number of tenure-track positions and graduate funding available. 
Inquiry in these fields is, therefore, not shaped by the restrictions and demands of 
the grant culture but through the reduction in the number of positions that sup-
port critical scholarly inquiry. 
Freedom of Teaching 
The demands that the grant culture places on the academic’s time is not the only 
means by which corporate culture imposes on teaching at the university. As we 
have previously stated, managerial priorities of efficiency and profitability have 
placed an increasing share of undergraduate teaching in the hands of contingent 
faculty who provide the university with a labor source that is inexpensive and ex-
pendable and, as such, not likely to enact academic freedom to challenge the status 
quo. Further, the overreliance on contingent faculty for classroom teaching reduces 
the number of tenured positions available, which weakens faculty governance and 
concentrates power in administrative positions. Classroom teaching is one of the 
primary ways the academic engages with the public as well as the means by which 
the corporate university distinguishes itself from other corporations and justifies 
its appeals for public funds. In light of this role, a model of higher education in 
which most teaching is carried out by those who are utterly without job security 
can hardly be expected to “help make public opinion more self-critical and more 
circumspect,” which the AAUP’s founders argued were characteristic functions of 
the university in a democratic society.59
The same neoliberal economic pressures that have left the bulk of under-
graduate teaching to contingent faculty and weakened the tenured faculty’s con-
trol over teaching have also led to sharp rises in tuition, reinforcing the trend of 
viewing university attendees as consumers rather than students. This superficial 
characterization has come with equally superficial appeals to their rights (as pay-
ing customers). Self-styled university “watchdog” groups like Campus Reform or 
David Horowitz’s Students for Academic Freedom have provided platforms for at-
tacks on tenure disguised as student advocacy.60 Calling on universities to respect 
the students’ “right” to a “balanced” curriculum, these groups argue that tenure is 
not so much a measure protecting academic freedom as it is a useful tool for pro-
tecting liberal indoctrination. It is no surprise that the targets of these crusades 
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for a balanced curriculum are most often professors in the humanities and social 
sciences, fields in which interrogations of the relationship between knowledge and 
power and critiques of exploitative and discriminatory policies and social prac-
tices are common. Dewey recognized that such threats to academic freedom were 
not spread equally across departments when he argued that, “Political economy, 
sociology, historical interpretation, psychology in its various possible applications, 
deal face-to-face with problems of life. . . . Hence the right and duty of academic 
freedom are even greater here than elsewhere.”61 Absent are calls from Horowitz 
and other advocates of tenure reform for business schools to provide coverage of 
Marxism in their lectures and course materials to achieve a balanced curriculum. 
Instead, by targeting those in the humanities and social sciences, the “watchdog” 
groups both misrepresent university teaching as whole and undermine what re-
mains of the critical function of the university. These groups have the power to 
shape university teaching without ever stepping inside the classroom. The eager-
ness with which they have disseminated students’ selective smartphone recordings 
as proof that universities are sites of leftist indoctrination facilitates not greater 
transparency and accountability, as advertised, but classrooms that stifle criti-
cal discourse and privilege the view that knowledge claims are always politically 
neutral and objective.62
While such unwanted exposure in the media has caused some universities to 
take measures against unauthorized recording in classrooms, it has also resulted in 
brand-conscious administrators managing instruction by suppressing potentially 
controversial or unconventional classroom practices, as was the case for Patricia 
Adler, a longtime tenured professor of sociology at the University of Colorado at 
Boulder. Adler’s teaching came under close scrutiny because of a skit about pros-
titution she coordinated for her class “Deviance in U.S. Society.” The skit involved 
undergraduate teaching assistants volunteering to act as prostitutes from differ-
ent social classes. The assistants studied their roles and developed scripts in order 
to answer questions from their classmates about their lifestyles, what led them to 
prostitution, and how their exposure to risks such as arrest, physical violence, and 
contracting HIV varies according to their social status. Adler had taught the course 
and used the skit for many years without complaint until the fall semester of 2013, 
when a former teaching assistant raised concern that the skit might be offensive. 
Adler claims that Steven Leigh, dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, informed 
her the skit was too risky in the “post-Penn State environment.”63 Since there is no 
obvious link between Jerry Sandusky’s criminal sexual abuse of children and adult 
undergraduate students volunteering to illustrate social stratification by pretending 
to be prostitutes, we infer that Leigh’s comment indicates the potential damage to 
his prominent university’s brand.64 
This case illustrates the degree to which potential threats to the university’s 
brand can supersede threats to academic freedom, even for tenured professors. The 
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result is a culture of silence that, as William Tierney and Vicente Lechuga argue, 
“occurs not only by attempts to fire a professor when he or she speaks out” but can 
be “pervasive to such an extent that individuals do not even consider speaking 
out.”65 It is for this reason that the 1915 Declaration argued that classroom discourse 
should be understood as a privileged form of communication “often designed to 
provoke opposition or arouse debate” and is “not to be supposed to be utterances 
for the public at large.”66 Combating the corrosive effects of a culture of silence and 
restoring the privileged status of classroom speech can only come through renewed 
support for the protections of tenure and faculty governance. It is no longer pos-
sible for the few who currently hold tenure to remain passive spectators of the as-
sault on academic freedom in higher education. Their tenured status has done little 
or nothing to prevent the transfer of three-quarters of undergraduate teaching to 
unprotected contingent faculty, nor has it given them the power to stem the rise 
of neoliberal managers who either directly suppress practices they see as potential 
controversies and threats to public relations or simply replace the freedom to teach 
with a checklist of standard practices conforming to a logic of accountability. Our 
position is not that professors should not be held responsible for the quality of their 
teaching or that a certain amount of incompetence is a reasonable price to pay for 
academic freedom. Rather, we contend that standardizing instruction degrades the 
quality of teaching instead of protecting it. Moreover, if we are correct that one’s 
professional peers are the best judges of competent instruction, then strengthen-
ing faculty governance and increasing the number of tenure-track instructors are 
the best measures against incompetent teaching.
Freedom of Extramural Speech 
Just as the primary activities of the academic share overlapping concerns, so 
too do the threats to academic freedom posed by cultural hegemony, corporate 
management styles, and neoliberalism generally. Having profoundly shaped and 
imposed limits upon freedom of inquiry and teaching at the university, the two 
activities most directly associated with the work of the academic, there is little 
reason to believe extramural speech would be safe from the same limitations. The 
1915 Declaration is ambivalent about how to balance the rights of professors as 
citizens and their responsibilities to their profession. On the one hand, the docu-
ment maintains that academics do not forfeit their right to support “organized 
movements which they believe to be in the public interest,” yet it qualifies this 
position with its stance that professors should “avoid hasty or unverified or exag-
gerated statements” as well as “intemperate or sensational modes of expression” 
when doing so.67 What counts as intemperate or sensational is open to broad in-
terpretation, and any speech that counters dominant ideologies, no matter how 
politely phrased, could easily be labeled as such by any administrator looking to 
purge the faculty of dissenters, just as Butler did during World War I with Cattell 
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and Dana.68 Extramural speech deemed sufficiently patriotic and supportive of 
the war efforts was, of course, unquestioned. The speech of those who swam with 
the current was, therefore, afforded a privileged status. Currently, tenure protects 
the extramural speech of professors from all political persuasions, provided that 
speech is not indicative of incompetence or unfitness for teaching and research at 
the university. But with tenure increasingly wedded to grant funding and grant 
funding reliant on transnational corporations, the privileged few with protected 
speech become less likely to be those who question the tenets of global capital-
ism or the role the university plays in promoting those tenets. Put differently, if 
the academic capitalists and entrepreneurs are the only ones whose extramural 
speech is protected, there is little possibility that the university could retain a criti-
cal function for the larger public. 
Much like Randolph Bourne’s criticism that Dewey and many other intel-
lectuals had lost their way during the World War I to such a degree that, “Their 
thought becomes little more than a description and justification of what is going 
on,” we argue that there is a parallel today with the university as an instrument of 
neoliberalism.69 Whereas the universities of 100 years ago endeavored to show their 
usefulness to the war’s effort to spread democracy throughout the world, today’s 
educational institutions seek to make themselves vital to the interests of global 
capital. Restructuring academic work to align with the efficiency, productivity and 
profitability of transnational corporations has proved antithetical to academic free-
dom. Academic capitalism redirects inquiry toward proprietary interests, relegates 
teaching to an exploited and expendable workforce, and protects only the speech 
of those who share its values. Without a renewed understanding that upholding 
academic freedom and tenure is an ethical obligation of the professoriate, there is 
little hope that the university can be much beyond a factory for producing patented 
knowledge and skilled workers for other corporations. If the university is to be of 
service to a public good, assuming that such a concept is possible and distinguish-
able from private goods, it is incumbent on the faculty to secure and defend a space 
of freedom in which a diversity of truth and knowledge claims can be debated and 
discussed under the name higher education.
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